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This version: May 2014
ABSTRACT: Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice
theory in order to deal with preference intensities. They allow individuals to show preference
intensities in the unit interval among each pair of options. In this framework, majority based
on difference in support can be used as a method of aggregation of individual preferences into a
collective preference: option a is preferred to option b if the sum of the intensities for a exceeds
the aggregated intensity of b in a threshold given by a real number located between 0 and the
total number of voters. Based on a three dimensional geometric approach, we provide a geometric
analysis of the non transitivity of the collective preference relations obtained by majority rule
based on difference in support. This aspect is studied by assuming that each individual reciprocal
preference satisfies a g-stochastic transitivity property, which is stronger than the usual notion of
transitivity.
KEYWORDS: Geometric voting – Reciprocal preferences – Difference in support – Stochastic
transitivity.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D72
1 Introduction
Given two options in a decision process, we can ask each individual if he/she prefers one option
to another or if he/she is indifferent. In this case, the individual preferences are referred to as
dichotomous (crisp or ordinal) preferences. In this framework, when two voters cast their votes
in favor of the same option, it does not necessarily mean that the two voters share common
perceptions on this option in comparison with the other option. Sen [29] is one of the first authors
who points out the insufficiency of information when the individual preferences are represented
by a dichotomous preference relation. The motivation for resorting to fuzzy set concepts is
straightforward enough: the preference relations appear intuitively not rich enough to capture
the preference intensities of decision makers. In other cases, the dichotomous preferences are
too discriminating to make sense in certain decision contexts. The importance of considering
intensities in the individual preferences has also been underlined by Nurmi [23, 24], Morales [22]
∗For helpful comments received, the authors want to thank W.V. Gehrlein, V. Merlin, and the participants of the
13th SAET conference. Financial support by the National Agency for Research (ANR) – research program “Dynamic
Matching and Interactions: Theory and Experiments” (DynaMITE) ANR. BLANC – and the “Mathe´matiques de la
de´cision pour l’inge´nierie physique et sociale” (MODMAD) project is gratefully acknowledged.
†Universite´ de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France ;
Universite´ Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France.
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(see translation in McLean and Urken [20]), Cook and Kress [3], Meek [21] and Tanino [30],
among others.
Reciprocal individual preferences have been introduced in the social choice literature for
dealing with preference intensities in different fields of decision theory. Such preferences allow
individuals to show preference intensities among each pair of options by a real number between
0 and 1. Notice that, in addition to the notion of preference intensity, the representation of the
individual preferences by a real number in the interval [0, 1] has a second different interpretation
in the literature: for authors such as Orlovsky [25], Ovchinnikov [26], Basu [2], and Barrett et
al. [1], among others, this number represents the degree of certainty with which the preference is
held. This means that this number represents the probability that an option is judged preferable to
another option for an individual. However, some authors such as Tanino [30] points out that the
notions of intensity of preference and the degree of certainty are similar. In other words, a high
(low) intensity is equivalent to a high (low) degree of certainty in the individual preference and
vice versa.
As in the case of dichotomous preferences, transitivity is one of the most basic property
required when the notion of reciprocal individual preference is introduced. This is important
because we need to assume some kind of rationality condition in order to avoid the possibility
of having incoherent individual preferences in election with more than two options. However, in
the case of reciprocal preferences, there is no unique definition of transitivity, and many proposals
have been suggested in the literature to ensure such rationality requirement (see, for instance,
Dubois and Prade [7], Garcı´a-Lapresta and Meneses [11], Zadeh [31], Dasgupta and Deb [4],
among others). Although a variety of types of transitivity has been introduced for reciprocal
relations, the notion of g-stochastic transitivity remains the most widely accepted and used in
the literature. A general definition for g-stochastic transitivity is given in De Baets et al. [6]
and De Baets and De Meyer [5]. Among the g-stochastic transitive relations, the arithmetic
mean stochastic transitivity (g = arithmetic mean), the weak stochastic transitivity (g = 0.5),
the moderate stochastic transitivity (g = min), and the strong stochastic transitivity (g = max)
play an important role.
Within the class of g-stochastic transitive reciprocal individual preferences, Garcı´a-Lapresta
and Llamazares [10] introduce and axiomatically characterize a new voting system as a possible
method of aggregation. This new method of aggregation, called majority based on difference in
support and denoted by M˜k, suggests that option a wins against b if the sum of the intensities for
a exceeds the sum of intensities of b in a threshold k given by a real number located between 0
and the total number of voters. This voting aggregation rule is based on the same idea as the one
found in majority based on difference in votes Mk′ in case preferences are dichotomous. Given
two options, a and b, a majority based on difference in votes Mk′ indicates that a is collectively
preferred to b, when the number of individuals who prefer a to b exceeds the number of individuals
who prefer b to a by at least a fixed integer k′ located between 0 and the total number of voters
minus 1. This rule was introduced and analyzed by Garcı´a-Lapresta and Llamazares [9] and its
complete axiomatic characterization can be found in Llamazares [15] and Houy [13]. Therefore,
majorities based on difference in support M˜k have been introduced in the social choice literature as
a generalization of majorities based on difference in votesMk′ by considering individual intensities
of preference instead of dichotomous preferences. Both rules can be interpreted as an appropriate
response to the criticism concerning simple majority which requires very poor difference for
declaring an option as a winner in an election. For other kinds of majorities which can be obtained
through the aggregation of non dichotomous preferences and their characterization, the reader is
referred to Garcı´a-Lapresta [8], Llamazares and Garcı´a-Lapresta [17, 18] and Llamazares [14, 16],
among others.
As in other voting aggregation systems, voting paradox constitutes a key aspect of the theory.
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In this respect, Llamazares, Pe´rez-Asurmendi and Garcı´a-Lapresta [19] provide some necessary
and sufficient conditions under which M˜k majorities lead to a transitive collective preference
relation. These results highlight the importance of the arithmetic mean for aggregating individual
intensities preferences, but also reveal that the resulting collective preferences are, in general, non
transitive. The only way to obtain transitive collective preferences is to assume that g is greater
than or equal to the arithmetic mean and k is close to the size of the population, i.e. almost
unanimous support are required to avoid intransitivities.
The proofs provided by the authors are mainly algebraic. In this article, we take an alternative
point of view by providing a geometric approach of the problem. The transitivity property allows
us to represent the problem in the unit cube. Our study shows that the regions for which the
collective preferences are non transitive are either constructed from or constitute trirectangular
tetrahedrons. Therefore, we do not only get good intuitions for the impossibility results but are
able to identify the shape of the regions for which the collective preference relations are non
transitive. More precisely, we geometrically show that these regions evolve continuously as a
function of the threshold k. This analysis is done for different types of g-stochastic transitive
individual preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic notions of reciprocal
preference relations and their aggregation by mean of majorities based on difference in support.
Section 3 presents the geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support, and
contains the main results of the paper. As it is the rule in voting geometry, the conclusion that we
draw are obtained for large electorates, i.e. when the population is assimilated to a continuum of
voters. Section 4 gives a geometric insight of the problem when the population is finite as assumed
in Llamazares, Pe´rez-Asurmendi and Garcı´a-Lapresta [19].
2 Basic framework and definitions
In this section, the concepts of reciprocal preference relations and their aggregation in the context
of majority with difference of support are introduced.
2.1 Reciprocal preference relations
Assume that there exist a population of n voters, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n and a finite set X of
m ≥ 2 alternatives. Each voter i has a reciprocal preference relation over X . The basic idea of
a reciprocal preference relation, also called a probabilistic or an ipsodual preference relation, is
that each voter provides numerical degrees of preference among the alternatives by means of real
numbers1, the intensities, within a bipolar scale in the unit interval. More specifically, for each
voter i, a reciprocal preference over X is defined as a function Qi : X × X → [0, 1] such that,
for each pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ X × X , Qi(a, b) + Qi(b, a) = 1. The closer Qi(a, b) is to
1, the more a is preferred to b, and the closer this number is to 0, the more b is preferred to a.
If Qi(a, b) = 0.5, then the voter i is indifferent between a and b. Notice that if, for each pair of
alternatives (a, b) ∈ X ×X , we have Qi(a, b) ∈ {0, 1}, then Qi can be considered as an ordinal
or dichotomous preference relation over X .
When we extend the set of alternatives from two to three alternatives, some properties of
transitivity must be verified for each voter i in order to guarantee individual rationality of the
reciprocal preference relation. There exist various kinds of transitive properties for reciprocal
preferences. Most of them are particular types of g-stochastic transitivity defined as follows. Let
G be the set of continuous, commutative and non-decreasing function g : [0.5, 1] × [0.5, 1] −→
1Notice that in this paper we make the hypothesis that individuals vote sincerely, so that the possibility of strategic
voting is not considered.
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[0.5, 1], and letX be the set of alternatives. For every voter i, a reciprocal preference relationQi on
X is g-stochastic transitive if the following condition holds for each tuple (a, b, c) ∈ X ×X ×X:[
Qi(a, b) > 0.5 ∧Qi(b, c) > 0.5
]⇒ [Qi(a, c) > 0.5 ∧Qi(a, c) ≥ g (Qi(a, b), Qi(b, c))]. (1)
The most commonly g-stochastic transitivity relations used so far are the strong stochastic
transitivity defined as g(x, y) = max{x, y}, the moderate stochastic transitivity defined as g(x, y) =
min{x, y}, the weak stochastic transitivity defined as the constant function g(x, y) = 0.5, and the
am-stochastic transitivity defined as the arithmetic mean of x and y, i.e. g(x, y) = (x+ y)/2.
2.2 Majorities based on difference in support
Based on the reciprocal preferences expressed by the set of voters over the set of alternatives, one
would like to arrive at a rule for the society that satisfies certain natural conditions. We follow
in Garcı´a-Lapresta and Llamazares’ [10] footsteps, who introduce and axiomatically characterize
majority rules based on difference in support. For this class of majority rules, denoted by M˜k, an
alternative a is collectively preferred to an alternative b if the aggregated intensity of preference
of a over b exceeds the aggregated intensity of b over a in a threshold k ∈ [0, n[, fixed before the
election. Formally, if we denote by Pk the asymmetric part of the ordinal collective preference
over X induced by Q1, . . . , Qn under M˜k, we have:
∀a, b ∈ X, aPkb :⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
Qi(a, b) >
n∑
i=1
Qi(b, a) + k. (2)
Using the fact that Qi(a, b) = 1−Qi(b, a) for each voter i, (2) is equivalent to:
∀a, b ∈ X, aPkb :⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
Qi(a, b) >
n+ k
2
. (3)
The indifference part of Pk, denoted by Ik, is defined, for each pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ X×X ,
as ¬(aPkb) and ¬(bPka). By (2), this gives:
∀a, b ∈ X, aIkb :⇐⇒
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
Qi(a, b)−
n∑
i=1
Qi(b, a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k. (4)
Putting the relation Qi(a, b) = 1−Qi(b, a) into (4) and dividing by 2, one obtains:
∀a, b ∈ X, aIkb :⇐⇒
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
Qi(a, b)− n
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k2 . (5)
In order to highlight these notions, we construct an example in which three voters have to
choose between three alternatives.
Example 1 Consider an election in which three voters have the following reciprocal preferences
on the set of alternativesX = {a, b, c}: Q1(a, b) = 1,Q1(b, c) = 1,Q1(a, c) = 1,Q2(a, b) = 0.1,
Q2(b, c) = 0.7, Q2(a, c) = 0.2, Q3(a, b) = 0.8, Q3(b, c) = 0.1 and Q3(a, c) = 0.2. It is easy
to verify that these reciprocal preferences satisfy the strong stochastic transitivity property. For
instance, voter 2 prefers b to c since Q2(b, c) = 0.7 and prefers c to a since Q2(c, a) = 0.8.
The strong stochastic transitivity means that voter 2 must prefer b to a (i.e. Q2(b, a) > 0.5) and
Q2(b, a) > 0.8. This is verified since Q2(b, a) = 0.9. For each pair of alternatives, the collective
outcomes corresponding to these individual preferences are given in Table 1.
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Table 1: Collective outcomes in Example 1 as a function of k.
a vs. b b vs. c a vs. c
0 ≤ k < 0.2 aPkb bPkc cPka
0.2 ≤ k < 0.6 aPkb bPkc cIka
0.6 ≤ k < 0.8 aPkb bIkc cIka
0.8 ≤ k < 3 aIkb bIkc cIka
2
Using this framework, Llamazares et al. [19] present some necessary and sufficient conditions
on the thresholds k under which the majority rule M˜k leads to a transitive relation Pk defined as
in (2). Their results highlight the importance of the arithmetic mean for aggregating individual
reciprocal preferences. Let us summarize the three main results obtained by these authors.
Proposition 1 (Llamazares et al. [19])
(i) For each g ∈ G and each threshold k ∈ [0, n − 1[, there exist profiles of reciprocal
preference relationsQ1, . . . , Qn such that the associated collective preferencesPk are non transitive.
(ii) For each g ∈ G greater than or equal to the arithmetic mean and each threshold k ∈
[n− 1, n[, Pk is transitive for each profile of reciprocal preference relations Q1, . . . , Qn.
(iii) For each function g ∈ G lying strictly below the arithmetic mean off the main diagonal,
and each k ∈ [n − 1, n[, there exist profiles of reciprocal preference relations Q1, . . . , Qn such
that the associated collective preferences Pk are non transitive.
Result (i) is an impossibility result on the set of reciprocal preference profiles. Nevertheless,
the authors exhibit profiles of individual preference relations under which transitivity is satisfied.
Regarding result (ii), some instances of reciprocal preference profiles are provided by the authors
to show how the inconsistencies diminish when the threshold k increases. Finally, result (iii)
establishes that the sufficient condition given in result (ii) is also necessary. As for result (i), this
result does not rule out situations in which transitivity is satisfied for some reciprocal preference
profiles. Instances of such profiles are provided by the authors. These results are very instructive
in so far as they reveal that inconsistencies are avoided only when the function g defining the
g-stochastic transitivity of the individual reciprocal preferences is greater than or equal to the
arithmetic mean and the majority rule approaches the unanimous rule. In other words, most of the
time the majority rules based on difference in support lead to impossibility results.
Llamazares et al. [19] prove their results either by constructing specific reciprocal preference
relations as in results (i) and (iii) or by deriving the logical implications of the assumptions of the
model as in result (ii). In this paper, we would like to take a different point of view of the problem.
By using a geometric approach, we identify the shape of the regions for which Pk is non transitive
for each reciprocal preference profile and each g-stochastic transitivity assumption. The advantage
of the geometric representation is twofold. First, we can visualize in the 3-dimensional euclidean
space the regions representing the inconsistencies and its evolution as a continuous function of the
parameter of the voting system when the size of the population is very large. Secondly, we can
provide an alternative and simple geometric proof of the results (i), (ii) and (iii) and show how
these results evolve when the population becomes large. In particular, we will be able to construct
geometrically the profiles for which Pk is non transitive for a given size of the population.
Therefore, as in Llamazares et al. [19], we study the non transitivity of the ordinal relation
Pk when the majority rule is M˜k for some threshold k. Given three distinct alternatives a, b and c
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chosen in X , we examine the voting situation in which:
aPkb ∧ bPkc ∧ ¬(aPkc).2
This means that, in addition of the well-known cyclic preferences defined as
aPkb ∧ bPkc ∧ cPka,
our examination includes the undesirable preferences defined as:
aPkb ∧ bPkc ∧ aIkc.
The remaining situations include the undesirable collective preferences of the type:
aPkb ∧ bIkc ∧ aIkc.
These situations are not considered in this paper. However, the examination of such undesirable
cases can be done quite naturally using the same geometric approach.
In the sequel, and without loss of generality, we focus the analysis to the case of three alternatives
a, b and c. Each reciprocal preference relation Qi is represented by a three-dimensional vector
Qi = (Qi(a, b), Qi(b, c), Qi(a, c)). In order to compare easily the set of admissible individual
reciprocal preference relations with the set of collective preference relations, we normalize Q by
computing the mean of the Qi and not the sum of the Qi as in (2)-(3). The reader can check that
the two representations are equivalent (see also Llamazares et al., [19], page 8). We have:
Q(a, b) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
Qi(a, b) ∈ [0, 1], and Q(b, a) = 1−Q(a, b). (6)
Proceeding in the same manner for (b, c) and (a, c), we see that Q is a reciprocal preference
relation. Consider any pair of alternatives, say (a, b), and take into account (6), we see that
inequalities defining the relation Pk in (2) and (3) and the relation Ik in (4) and (5) can be rewritten
as follows:
aPkb :⇐⇒ Q(a, b) > 0.5 + k
2n
. (7)
aIkb :⇐⇒ 0.5 + k
2n
≥ Q(a, b) ≥ 0.5− k
2n
.
Finally, by setting ε = k/2n, the aim of this paper is to characterize the regions for which Q is
such that:
Q(a, b) > 0.5 + ε ∧ Q(b, c) > 0.5 + ε ∧ ¬ (Q(a, c) > 0.5 + ε) . (8)
3 Geometrization and main results
To our knowledge, Donald G. Saari is the first author who has shown how simple geometry tools
can be used to analyze and discover new properties in voting systems where voters have ordinal
preferences over a set of alternatives. Saari’s geometric tools have given rise to a large number
of papers. We refer the interested reader to [27, 28] for further information. All our results must
be viewed as a characterization of the regions of inconsistencies when the population becomes
2By symmetry, we also consider the case bPka, cPkb and ¬(cPka).
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arbitrarily large. This implies that the threshold ε in (8) must be viewed as a share of the size n of
the population so that ε takes its values in the interval [0, 0.5[.
The principal advantage of the restriction to three alternatives and the representation (7) is
that we can locate geometrically all possible individual and collective reciprocal preferences in a
specific subset of the 3-dimensional euclidean space. Indeed, any (restricted) reciprocal preference
Qi = (Qi(a, b), Qi(b, c), Qi(a, c)) is located into the unit cube whose vertices are (1,1,1), (1,0,1),
(0,1,1), (0,1,0), (1,0,0), (0,0,0), (1,1,0), and (0,0,1). The six first vertices define the situations
where the reciprocal preferences can be assimilated to the six linear orders and the two last vertices
represent the remaining two cyclic ordinal preferences. For instance, the point (1,0,1) represents
the linear order given by a  c  b. The point (1, 1, 0) represents the cyclic preference relation
a  b, b  c but c  a. Because each collective preference Q = (Q(a, b), Q(b, c), Q(a, c)) is
defined as a convex combination of individual reciprocal preferences, it also lies in the unit cube.
Given that the function g restricts the feasible individual reciprocal preferences Qi, it also
restricts its convex hull defining the feasible region of the collective preferences Q. We shall
call this convex hull the region R0 which is the first principal region of interest for each case
of g-stochastic transitivity. So, keep in mind that the principal region R0 depends on g. When
we consider a collective preference, two exclusive cases arise: either it belongs to the region
corresponding to a non transitive preference Pε as defined in (8), or it does not contradict the
transitivity of Pε for the triplet under consideration. We shall call R1 the union of the regions
which guarantee the non transitivity of Pε. Note that R1 also depends on the type of g-stochastic
transitivity under consideration and on the value of ε.
Knowing the regions R0 and R1, it is tempting to estimate how likely it is to observe any
non transitive relation Pε. Assuming that each collective preference Q is equally probable in the
feasible set of collective preferences, one could compute the ratio between the volume of R1 and
the volume of R0 in order to estimate the probability of the non transitivity of Pε:
volume of R1
volume of R0
. (9)
Choosing the uniform distribution over all collective preferences Q can be viewed as a first
approximation when no information is available on the distribution of the individual reciprocal
preferences. Nevertheless, this choice is disputable as soon as the underlying individual reciprocal
preferences are assumed to be chosen independently according to the same distribution. Indeed,
under some regular assumptions, the multivariate central limit theorem indicates that Q will be
distributed according to the normal distribution N (µ, (√n)−1K) for n sufficiently large, where
µ and K denote the mean and the covariance matrix of the individual distribution, respectively.
Furthermore, according to the law of large numbers, Q will be close to the mean of the individual
distribution. Therefore, although (9) is attractive from a computational point of view, it does not
fit with a probabilistic model where independence is assumed. This condition of independence is a
key assumption in the two elementary models used in the framework of dichotomous preferences.
In these models, the process of determining how likely it is to observe any voting event
outcome essentially involves obtaining the set of voting situations that exhibit the outcome in
question, and then accumulating the likelihoods of observing the voting situations in this particular
set. A voting situation indicates, for each dichotomous preference relation, the number (or the
fraction) of voters associated with this preference relation. The first model, known as the Impartial
Anonymous Culture condition (IAC), assumes that the voting situations are drawn independently
and uniformly. The second model, known as the Impartial Culture condition (IC), is defined
in terms of voter preference profiles, so that individual voter’s preferences are not anonymous
in voter profiles while they are anonymous in voting situations. A profile is then obtained by
making independent random assignments of the possible dichotomous preference relations to
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voters, according to some probability distribution. In the IC model, this probability distribution
is the uniform distribution. The voting situation that follows from this profile is then obtained by
determining the number of voters that have each of the different dichotomous preference relations.
It must be emphasized that no claim whatsoever is being made that either IC or IAC represents any
realistic voting scenario. They are considered for two important reasons that are developed in detail
in Gehrlein and Lepelley [12]. To our knowledge, there is no equivalent models in the framework
of reciprocal preferences. One difficulty is that each voter may provide numerical degrees of
preference among the alternatives by means of real numbers between 0 and 1, so that the set
of voting situations in not denumerable. Picking individual reciprocal preferences independently
according to the same distribution as suggested above has the same spirit as IC, and so can be used
to estimate how likely it is to observe any non transitive relation Pε. In the following, we focus
our analysis on the geometric properties of the region R1.
3.1 The case of weak stochastic transitivity
In this section, we focus the attention on the simple case where the individual preference relations
are reciprocal and g = 0.5, i.e. the individual preference relations are weak stochastic transitive.
In a first step, we delineate the feasible region R of all individual reciprocal preferences inside
the unit cube and the induced region R0 of all feasible collective reciprocal preferences Q. We
will see that R0 is the union of R and some regions in the two excluded sub-cubes for which the
collective preference Q is non transitive. For the sake of exposition, we cut the unit cube by the
three planes given by Qi(a, b) = 0.5, Qi(b, c) = 0.5 and Qi(a, c) = 0.5, respectively. We get
a subdivision of the unit cube into eight sub-cubes. Note that the two sub-cubes which have the
vertices (1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) respectively, must be excluded of the feasible region of all individual
reciprocal preference relations whatever the g-stochastic transitivity function. Indeed, each point
inside these two sub-cubes violates condition (1) of the g-stochastic transitivity. For instance, the
point Qi = (0.8, 0.7, 0.3) corresponds to the situation
Qi(a, b) = 0.8 ∧ Qi(b, c) = 0.7 ∧ ¬(Qi(a, c) > 0.5).
It follows that the region of all feasible individual reciprocal preference relations is represented by
the six sub-cubes in the left-hand side of Figure 1.
Figure 1: The entire region of all possible individual (left-hand side) and collective (right-hand
side) reciprocal preferences for g = 0.5.
We begin with the simplest case where ε = 0. Our first result characterizes the regions of R1
where Pε is non transitive for ε = 0. Note that due to the symmetry of the problem, we only have
to consider the case
aP0b ∧ bP0c ∧ ¬(aP0c).
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The extension to the symmetric case
bP0a ∧ cP0b ∧ ¬(cP0a)
is immediate. From a geometric point of view, if R, H , D, G . . . denote some regions on one
side of the cube, the regions R∗, H∗, D∗, G∗ . . . denote the symmetric regions with respect to the
center of the unit cube (0.5, 0.5, 0.5). This amounts to saying that if one proves that the collective
preferenceQ = (Q(a, b), Q(b, c), Q(a, c)) is non transitive, then its imageQ∗ = (1−Q(a, b), 1−
Q(b, c), 1−Q(a, c)) obtained under this point symmetry operation, is also non transitive.
Proposition 2 For ε = 0 and g = 0.5, the region R1 for which P0 is non transitive is the union of
the regions R2 and R∗2, where
R2 =
{
Q ∈ [0.5, 1]2 × [0, 0.5] : Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) ≤ 1.5
}
.
From a geometric point of view, R2 is obtained by subtracting from the sub-cube [0.5, 1]2× [0, 0.5]
a trirectangular tetrahedron.3 The region R0 is given by the union of R and R2 ∪R∗2.
Proof. All possible collective reciprocal preference relations Q in this election lies in the region
R0 given by the convex hull of the six possible sub-cubes denoted by R. This convex hull is thus
composed of R plus some regions belonging to the two excluded sub-cubes. The entire region
R0 of all possible collective reciprocal preference relations is represented in the right-hand side of
Figure 1, which consists of the six sub-cubes plus to symmetric shaded regions. We will focus the
analysis on one of these two shaded regions, denoted by R2 and R∗2. Regarding R2, its vertices
(1, 1, 0.5), (1, 0.5, 0) and (0.5, 1, 0) are contained in the plane of equation given by:
Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) = 1.5. (10)
So, R2 is defined as:
R2 =
{
Q ∈ [0.5, 1]2 × [0, 0.5] : Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) ≤ 1.5
}
.
From Figure 1, one sees that R2 can be equivalently obtained from the sub-cube [0.5, 1]2× [0, 0.5]
by subtracting a trirectangular tetrahedron where the area of its base is one-half of the area of the
face of the sub-cube and its height coincides with the length of the edge of the sub-cube. Therefore,
R0 = R ∪R2 ∪R∗2. 
When ε > 0, several regions of interest emerge for a preference relation Pε. These regions are
added in Figure 2 (the right-hand side is an inside view). To describe each of these regions, it is
useful to decompose the unit interval as follows:
[0, 1] = [0, 0.5− ε] ∪ [0.5− ε, 0.5] ∪ [0.5, 0.5 + ε] ∪ [0.5 + ε, 1].
This decomposition induces a decomposition of the unit cube [0, 1]3 into 64 parallelepipeds. For
instance, consider the parallelepiped D3, in dark on Figure 2, and contained in the sub-cube
[0.5, 1]× [0, 0.5]× [0, 0.5]. It is given by:
D3 = [0.5 + ε, 1]× [0.5− ε, 0.5]× [0, 0.5− ε]. (11)
3Recall that a trirectangular tetrahedron is a tetrahedron where all three face angles at one vertex are right angles.
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If we pick at random an element of D3, then we select a collective outcome Q which corresponds
almost surely to a non transitive preference relation Pε of the following type:
cPεa ∧ aPεb ∧ cIεb.
The other dark parallelepipeds D1 and D2 lead to similar non transitive preference relations Pε.
Consider the parallelepipedG2, in grey on Figure 2, and contained in the same sub-cube [0.5, 1]2×
[0, 0.5]. It is given by:
G2 = [0.5 + ε, 1]× [0, 5 + ε, 1]× [0.5− ε, 0.5]. (12)
If we pick at random an element of G2, we select a collective outcome Q which corresponds
almost surely to a non transitive preference relation Pε of the following type:
aPεb ∧ bPεc ∧ aIεc.
The other grey parallelepipeds G1 and G3 lead to similar non transitive preference relations Pε.
Note that these preference relations Pε are of the same type of those associated with the D1, D2,
and D3. Consider the sub-cube G0, in grey on Figure 2, and given by:
G0 = [0.5 + ε, 1]
2 × [0, 0.5− ε].
It contains only elements corresponding to cyclic preferences Pε. Consider now the parallelepiped
H2, hatched on Figure 2, and contained in the sub-cube [0.5, 1]2 × [0, 0.5]. It is given by:
H2 = [0.5, 0.5 + ε]× [0.5 + ε, 1]× [0.5− ε, 0.5]. (13)
If we pick at random an element of H2, we select a collective outcome Q which corresponds
almost surely to a preference relation Pε of the following type:
aIεb ∧ bPεc ∧ cIεa.
These preference relations Pε do not satisfy (8), and so are not considered as non transitive. The
other hatched parallelepipeds H1 and H3 lead to similar preference relations Pε. Finally, the sub-
cube W , in white in the right-hand side of Figure 2, is given by:
W = [0.5, 0.5 + ε]2 × [0.5− ε, 0.5]. (14)
W contains collective outcomes which correspond almost surely to preference relations Pε of the
following type:
aIεb ∧ bIεc ∧ aIεc.
Once again, these preference relations do not satisfy (8), and as such are not considered as non
transitive. All these regions must be taken into consideration when we characterize the region R1
for which Pε is non transitive. The following proposition exploits these facts.
Figure 2: Some regions of interest for Pε. The right-hand side is an inside view of the situation.
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Figure 3: The region for which Pε is non transitive for g = 0.5 and ε ∈]0, 0.25].
In the following proposition and for the rest of the article, D and H are defined as:
D =
3⋃
l=1
Dl, H =
3⋃
l=1
Hl.
Proposition 3 For g = 0.5, the regionR1 for which Pε is non transitive is the union of the regions
R3 and R∗3 where R3 = D∪ [R2 \ (H ∪W )]. The shape of the region R2 \ (H ∪W ) is a function
of ε:
1. For ε ∈]0, 0.25], (H ∪W ) ⊆ R2 ;
2. For ε ∈]0.25, 1/3], W ⊆ R2 and, for each l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Hl \ R2 is a trirectangular
tetrahedron.
3. For ε ∈]1/3, 0.5[, for each l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (Hl ∪W ) \ R2 and W \ R2 are trirectangular
tetrahedrons and
3⋂
l=1
(Hl ∪W ) \R2 =W \R2.
Proof. Because g = 0.5, the region R0 is still the region represented in the right-hand side of
Figure 1. The region R1 ⊆ R0 is formed by two symmetric connected regions. One of these two
connected regions, denoted by R3, is represented by the dark and grey regions on Figure 3. By
symmetry of the problem, the second region R∗3 is similar to R3, but located on the other side of
the cube. The union of these regions defines the region R1. We decompose R3 as follows: the
three dark regionsD1,D2 andD3 plusR2∩R1, whereR2 is given by Proposition 2. So, it remains
to characterize R2 ∩R1. Note that R2 = (R2 ∩R1) ∪ (R2 \R1). As we already know R2, let us
compute R2 \R1. From the discussion preceding Proposition 3, we deduce that:
R2 \R1 = (H1 ∩R2) ∪ (H2 ∩R2) ∪ (H3 ∩R2) ∪ (W ∩R2).
It follows that:
R3 = D ∪ (R2 ∩R1)
= D ∪ (R2 \ (R2 \R1))
= D ∪ [R2 \ ((H ∩R2) ∪ (W ∩R2))].
= D ∪ [R2 \ (H ∪W )]. (15)
In order to delineate the region R3, we distinguish three cases according to the value taken by
ε. Our cases are issued from the structure of the intersections appearing above, i.e. the relative
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position of the plane of equation (10) delimiting the region R2 and the regions W , H1, H2, H3.
The region R3 evolves continuously as a function of ε and its geometric representation changes
from case to case.
Case 1: ε ∈]0, 0.25]. Figure 3 represents an instance of the problem for ε ∈]0, 0.25]. Indeed, when
ε ∈]0, 0.25], W , and H1, H2, H3 are contained in R2. To see this, it suffices to note that each
point of these regions lies above the plane of equation (10). To compute the critical value 0.25,
consider, without loss of generality, the hatched parallelepiped H2. Pick the vertex of coordinates
(0.5 + ε, 1, 0.5− ε). By (10):
0.5 + ε+ 1− 0.5 + ε ≤ 1.5 if and only if ε ∈]0, 0.25].
In a similar way, the vertex (0.5+ ε, 0.5+ ε, 0.5− ε) of the white cube W lies above the plane of
equation (10) if and only if ε ∈ [0, 1/3]. Therefore, (H ∪W ) ⊆ R2.
Case 2: ε ∈]0.25, 1/3]. In this case, the white cubeW is still contained inR2 whereas the hatched
parallelepipeds H1, H2, H3 are not longer contained in R2. The critical value ε = 1/3 is obtained
when W intersects the plane of equation (10). This situation is illustrated in the left-hand side of
Figure 4. Therefore, W ⊆ R2 but Hl \ R2 is non empty for each l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. To determine
the shape of each polyhedron Hl \ R2, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let us focus, without loss of generality, on
the hatched parallelepiped H2. The plane of equation (10) cuts H2 into two parts such that each
vertex of H2 is an element of R2 except the vertex of coordinates (0.5 + ε, 1, 0.5− ε). It follows
that H2 \R2 is a trirectangular tetrahedron. For the sake of completeness, let us locate the vertices
of the trirectangular tetrahedron H2 \ R2. All three face angles at Q0 = (0.5 + ε, 1, 0.5 − ε) are
right angles, and the three edges [Q0Q1], [Q0Q2] and [Q0Q3] that meet at the right angle are the
legs of the tetrahedron. The coordinates of the points Q1, Q2 and Q3 are contained in the plane of
equation (10) (see Figure 4). The coordinates of Q3 are Q3(a, b) = 0.5 + ε, Q3(a, c) = 0.5 − ε
and by (10) we find Q3(b, c) = 1.5 − 2ε. Proceeding in a similar way for the points Q1 and Q2,
we find that Q1 = (1 − ε, 1, 0.5 − ε) and Q2 = (0.5 + ε, 1, ε). From these coordinates, we find
that the length of each leg is equal to (2ε − 0.5). It follows that each of these tetrahedrons grows
as a function of ε. Beyond the critical value ε = 1/3, these trirectangular tetrahedrons intersect
each other to form a new tetrahedron. This situation is illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure
4, and studied in Case 3. Note these tetrahedrons correspond to collective preferences such that:
they are not considered as non transitive according to (8), and they cannot be obtained by a convex
combination of individual reciprocal preferences.
Case 3: ε ∈ [1/3, 0.5[. Beyond the critical value ε = 1/3, the trirectangular tetrahedrons intersect
each other as illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 4. To better understand the geometric
form taken by this intersection, it is interesting to consider again the inside view of our problem as
depicted by the right-hand side of Figure 2. As ε increases, the white cube W grows as well. The
regions H1 \ R2, H2 \ R2 and H3 \ R2 do no longer constitute trirectangular tetrahedrons when
the plane of equation (10) cutsW into two parts, i.e. when ε > 1/3. This is true because the plane
of equation (10) cuts each Hl \ R2 in such a way that at least two vertices remain in each side of
this plane. On the contrary, by considering the parallelepipeds (Hl∪W ), l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we get that
the regions (H1 ∪W ) \R2, (H2 ∪W ) \R2, (H3 ∪W ) \R2 and W \R2 are four trirectangular
tetrahedrons. Furthermore, we have:
3⋂
l=1
(Hl ∪W ) \R2 =W \R2.
Proceeding in a similar fashion as in Case 2, we obtain that the length 3ε − 1 of each leg of the
trirectangular tetrahedron W \ R2 is an increasing function of ε. Note also that the legs of the
tetrahedron (Hl ∪W ) \R2, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, can be computed in a manner similar to those of Hl \R2
in Case 2. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 
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Figure 4: The region for which Pε is non transitive for g = 0.5 and ε ∈]0.25, 1/3] (left-hand side)
and for g = 0.5 and ε ∈]1/3, 0.5] (right-hand side).
Thanks to Propositions 2 and 3, the geometric construction of the polyhedrons R2 and R3 can
be presented in a simple way. For ε = 0, R2 is obtained from the sub-cube [0.5, 1]2 × [0, 0.5] by
subtracting a tetrahedron. For small values of ε, R3 is the union of D and R2 \
(
H ∪W ) such
that (W ∪ H) ⊆ R2. For intermediate values of ε, the cube W is still contained in R2, but one
part of the region H lies outside R2. This is consequence of the fact that the regions H and W
grow continuously in ε. It appears that H \ R2 is a trirectangular tetrahedron. For high values of
ε, part of the cube W lies outside R2. The region W \R2 forms also a trirectangular tetrahedron.
Therefore, the region for which Pε is non transitive on one side of the unit cube grows continuously
in ε, evolving from R2 to D ∪
[
R2 \
(
H ∪W )] when ε varies from 0 to 0.5. Similar arguments
apply to the other side of the unit-cube.
3.2 A sub-class of g-stochastic transitivity relations
In the previous section, we have studied the case of weak stochastic transitivity, which amounts to
choosing the smallest function g in G. Now, consider any g in G. Because g([0.5, 1]2) ⊆ [0.5, 1],
one deduces that the vertex (1, 1, 1) of the unit cube corresponding to the linear order Qi(a, b) =
Qi(b, c) = Qi(a, c) = 1 belongs to the feasible region R of all individual reciprocal preferences.
Proceeding in the same way for each sub-cube, one deduces that the six vertices corresponding
to the six linear orders belong to the feasible region R of all individual reciprocal preferences.
It follows that the convex hull C of these six vertices is contained in the convex hull R0 of R:
C ⊆ R0. To compute C, consider its vertices (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). They are contained
in the plane of equation given by:
Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) = 1. (16)
By a symmetry argument, one obtains:
C =
{
Q ∈ [0, 1]3 : 0 ≤ Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) ≤ 1
}
.
Select the sub-class G0 of functions g : [0.5, 1]2 −→ [0.5, 1] in G such that:
g(Q(a, b), Q(b, c)) ≥ Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)− 1, (17)
where Q is a point lying in the sub-cube [0.5, 1]3. Applying this condition in each sub-cube, one
obtains that R ⊆ C, and so R0 ⊆ C, which yields, by the above arguments, C = R0. It follows
that, for a fixed ε, the region R1 of non transitivity of Pε is the same whatever g ∈ G0. Among
the functions g belonging to G0, we found the arithmetic mean, the maximum function and the
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minimum function. In the rest of this section, we will focus on this sub-class G0 of functions, so
that the results obtained are valid in particular for the am-stochastic transitivity relation, the strong
transitivity relation and the moderate transitivity relation.
As an example, consider Figure 5. The left-hand side of this figure depicts for three sub-cubes
the faces (in dark) delimiting the feasible regions of the individual reciprocal preference relations
satisfying the condition of moderate stochastic transitivity. The right-hand side of this figure
depicts for the same three sub-cubes the faces delimiting the feasible regions of the individual
reciprocal preference relations satisfying the condition of strong stochastic transitivity. These faces
represent the minimum (left-hand side) and maximum (right-hand side) operators on three sub-
cubes. For each of these three sub-cubes, the feasible reciprocal preference relations are located
behind these faces. The same approach can be used for the arithmetic mean function. The left-hand
side of Figure 6 depicts for three sub-cubes the faces (in dark) delimiting the feasible regions of
the individual reciprocal preference relations satisfying the condition of arithmetic mean stochastic
transitivity. The important point to notice is that in each case the individual reciprocal preference
relations defined by the coordinates (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) are feasible. It follows easily
from this that the convex hull of each of these three sets of feasible reciprocal preference relations
coincides, i.e. the region R0 is the same when g is defined as the maximum, the minimum or the
arithmetic mean. The region R0 is represented in the right-hand side of Figure 6, where the dark
triangle is the face of R0 contained in the plane of equation (16).
Figure 5: Regions of feasible individual reciprocal preference relations for g = min (left-hand
side) and g = max (right-hand side).
Figure 6: Regions of feasible individual reciprocal preference relations for g = am (left-hand
side) and the region R0 of all possible collective reciprocal preference relations for the cases of
g-stochastic relations where g ∈ G0 (right-hand side).
From the above discussion, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 4 For ε = 0 and g ∈ G0, the region R1 for which P0 is non transitive is the union
of the regions R4 and R∗4, where R4 is a trirectangular tretrahedron whose vertices are given by
(0.5, 1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5, 0), (1, 0.5, 0.5) and the center of the unit cube (0.5, 0.5, 0.5). The regionR0
is given by C.
Proof. As mentioned above C = R0 for each g ∈ G0. From Figure 6, remark that R0 is obtained
by subtracting from the unit cube two trirectangular tetrahedrons with unit legs. The region R1 is
the part of the regionR0 contained in the two excluded sub-cubes of the unit cube. One-half of this
region R1, denoted by R4, is represented in the left-hand side of Figure 7. Consider the excluded
sub-cube [0.5, 1]2× [0, 0.5]. Its vertices (0.5, 1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5, 0), (1, 0.5, 0.5) are contained in the
plane of equation given by
Q(a, b) +Q(b, c)−Q(a, c) = 1,
and delimiting C. One easily verifies that its vertex (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) belongs to C, whereas the four
other vertices lie outside C. It follows that R4 = C ∩ ([0.5, 1]2 × [0, 0.5]) forms a trirectangular
tetrahedron with legs of length 0.5, and whose vertices are (0.5, 1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5, 0), (1, 0.5, 0.5)
and the center of unit cube (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (see the left- hand side of Figure 7). 
Figure 7: The region for which Pε is non transitive for ε = 0 and g ∈ G0. The right-hand side of
this figure provides an inside view of this region.
In the following, G is defined as:
G =
3⋃
l=1
Gl.
Proposition 5 For g ∈ G0, the region R1 for which Pε is non transitive is the union of the regions
R5 andR∗5 whereR5 = (G0∪G∪D)∩R0, andR0 = C. The shape of the regionR5 is a function
of ε:
1. For ε ∈]0, 1/6], G0 ∩ R0 6= ∅, G ∩ R0 6= ∅, and D ∩ R0 6= ∅. Furthermore, for each
l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (G0∪Gl∪Dl)∩R0 is a trirectangular tetrahedron. The intersection between
these trirectangular tetrahedrons constitutes also a trirectangular tetrahedron contained in
G0.
2. For ε ∈]1/6, 0.25[, G0 ∩ R0 = ∅, G ∩ R0 6= ∅, and D ∩ R0 6= ∅. Furthermore, the
polyhedrons (Gl ∪ Dl) ∩ R0, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, form three pairwise-disjoint trirectangular
tetrahedrons.
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3. For ε ∈ [0.25, 0.5[, G0 ∩ R0 = ∅, G ∩ R0 = ∅, and D ∩ R0 6= ∅. Furthermore, the
polyhedronsDl∩R0, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, form also a collection of pairwise-disjoint trirectangular
tetrahedrons.
Proof. The region R0 still coincides to C. The region R1 is constituted by the dark and
grey regions, represented in Figure 2, contained in the region R0 represented in Figure 6. To
delineate the region R1, formed by two symmetric and connected regions, denoted by R5 and R∗5
respectively, we need to consider the following regions already used in the previous results and
represented in Figure 2: the sub-cube G0 and the parallelepipeds G1 ∪D1, G2 ∪D2 and G3 ∪D3.
Each of these parallelepipeds share a face with G0. The region (G0∪G∪D)∩R0 constitutes one
of the two symmetric and connected regions of R1. Thus, we have:
R5 = (G0 ∩R0) ∪ (G ∪D ∩R0) = (G0 ∪G ∪D) ∩R0. (18)
In order to characterize the shape of R1, we distinguish several cases according to the value taken
by ε. Our cases are issued from the structure of the intersections appearing above, i.e. the relative
position of the plane of equation (16) delimiting one connected part of the region R0 and the
regions G0, G1 ∪D1, G2 ∪D2 and G3 ∪D3. The region R1 evolves continuously as a function
of ε and its geometric representation changes from case to case.
Cases 2 and 3: ε ∈]1/6, 0.5]. Consider the sub-cube G0 = [0.5 + ε, 1]2 × [0, 0.5− ε]. Using the
plane of equation (16) we see that G0 ∩R2 = ∅. Indeed, take the vertex (0.5+ ε, 0.5+ ε, 0.5− ε)
of G0. By (16), we have:
0.5 + ε+ 0.5 + ε− 0.5 + ε > 1 if and only if ε > 1/6.
The region R5 = (G ∪ D) ∩ R0 is represented on Figure 8 for ε = 0.25. More precisely, R5
corresponds to the three dark tetrahedrons in the right-hand side of Figure 8. The right-hand side
of Figure 8 gives an inside view of these tetrahedrons only. The white triangles of the left-hand side
of Figure 8 are the faces of these tetrahedrons lying on the plane of equation (16). To understand
this point, consider, without loss of generality, the polyhedron (G2∪D2)∩R0. The parallelepiped
G2 ∪ D2 is given by [0.5 + ε, 1]2 × [0.5 − ε, 0.5 + ε]. The vertices (1, 0.5 + ε, 0.5 + ε) and
(0.5+ε, 1, 0.5+ε) of this parallelepiped are contained in the plane of equation (16). Furthermore,
the vertex of coordinates (0.5 + ε, 0.5 + ε, 0.5 + ε) of this parallelepiped lies above the plane of
equation (16). Finally, among the points of coordinates (0.5+ε, 0.5+ε,Q(a, c)) belonging toR0,
the only one contained in the plane of equation (16) is the point of coordinates (0.5+ε, 0.5+ε, 2ε).
The convex hull of these four points contained in R0 forms a trirectangular tetrahedrons with legs
of length 0.5− ε. Proceeding in the same way for (G1 ∪D1)∩R0 and (G3 ∪D3)∩R0, conclude
that (G ∪ D) ∩ R0 is the union of three pairwise-disjoint trirectangular tetrahedrons. Note that
when ε ∈]0.25, 0.5], the regions G1 ∩R0, G2 ∩R0 and G3 ∩R0 are empty, as claimed in Case 3.
This is also the reason why the tetrahedrons are colored in dark in the right hand side of Figure 8.
In Figure 9, ε = 1/6 so that G1 ∩R0, G2 ∩R0 and G3 ∩R0 are non empty.
Case 1: ε ∈]0, 1/6]. The left-hand side of Figure 10 provides an outside view of the situation
where ε ∈]0, 1/6]. As in Figure 8, the faces of the parallelepipeds are supposed to be transparent in
order to make visible the intersections between the plane of equation (16) and these parallelepipeds.
The right-hand side of Figure 10 provides an inside view of such a situation. We see that the
intersection between the three trirectangular tetrahedrons forms a new trirectangular tetrahedron
contained in G0. When ε decreases, the cube in grey G0 grows. The regions (G1 ∪ D1) ∩ R0,
(G2 ∪ D2) ∩ R0 and (G3 ∪ D3) ∩ R2 do no longer constitute trirectangular tetrahedrons when
the plane of equation (16) cuts G0 into two parts, i.e. when ε < 1/6. By contrast, the regions
(G1 ∪D1 ∪G0)∩R0, (G2 ∪D2 ∪G0)∩R0, (G3 ∪D3 ∪G3)∩R0 and G0 ∩R0 constitute four
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trirectangular tetrahedrons. The arguments are similar to those of Case 3 contained in the proof of
Proposition 3. 
Figure 8: The region for which Pε is non transitive for g ∈ G0 and ε ∈ [1/6, 0.5[. This figure is
drawn for ε = 1/4. The figure in the right-hand side is an inside view of this region.
Figure 9: The region for which Pε is non transitive for g ∈ G0 and ε = 1/6. The figure in the
right-hand side is a full inside view of the unit cube.
Figure 10: The region for which Pε is non transitive for g ∈ G0 and ε ∈]0, 1/6]. The figure in the
right-hand side is an inside view of this region.
Propositions 4 and 5 allow to understand the geometric construction of the polyhedrons R4
and R5. For high values of ε, R5 is defined as the intersection between the polyhedron D and the
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region R0. The parallelepipeds Dl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, have a non empty intersection with R0 whereas
the parallelepipeds Gl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, lie outside R0. The latter is obtained from the unit cube
by subtracting a trirectangular tetrahedron with unit length legs. The intersection between each
parallelepiped Dl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and R0 is itself a trirectangular tetrahedron. For intermediate
values of ε, one region of each parallelepiped Gl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, lies inside R0, which explains the
transition from Case2 to Case3, even if the shape of the regions of interest does not change:
because Gl and Dl have a common face, we still obtain a trirectangular tetrahedron when we
consider the intersection R0 ∩ (Gl ∩Dl). The regions R0 ∩ (Gl ∩Dl), l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are pairwise
disjoint up to ε = 1/6. At this value, they meet at the point (2/3, 2/3, 1/3), which is contained in
the plane of equation (16) defining the region R0. Below this value, the intersection between these
tetrahedrons forms a new tetrahedron contained in G0. When ε vanishes, this new tetrahedron
converges to R4. Therefore, the region for which Pε is non transitive on one side of the unit cube
grows continuously as a function of ε, evolving from D ∩ R0 to R4 when ε varies from 0.5 to 0.
Similar arguments apply to the other side of the unit-cube.
Finally, note that when one considers functions g ∈ G\G0, non transitive collective preferences
trivially exist because the admissible set of individual preferences intersect with the non transitive
regions. So, picking a uniform profile in this intersection leads to a non transitive collective
preference (identical to each individual preference). The largest subclass of functions g for which
this phenomenon does not appear is precisely G0.
4 The discrete case
Propositions 2-5 can be compared with the results contained in Proposition 1 by Llamazares et al.
[19]. Point (i) in Proposition 1 shows that for each g ∈ G, there does not exist a threshold k ∈
[0, n− 1[ such that Pk is transitive for each profile of reciprocal preference relations. Propositions
2 and 3 characterize the regions for which Pε is non transitive for g = 0.5. Propositions 4 and 5
characterize these regions for g ∈ G0. On the one hand, our results reveal that these regions are
non-empty for ε ∈ [0, 0.5[, which is consistent with result (i) of Proposition 1. On the other hand,
point (ii) of Proposition 1 establishes that for each g ∈ G greater than or equal to the arithmetic
mean and each threshold k ∈ [n − 1, n[, Pk is transitive for each profile of reciprocal preference
relations. Point 3. of Proposition 5 differs from results (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 on two
aspects. First, point 3. of Proposition 5 indicates that the regions R5 and R∗5 for which Pε is non
transitive are non empty, though their volume is very small, for ε close to 0.5. Furthermore, this
remains true even if g is greater than or equal the arithmetic mean, e.g. g = min, whereas result
(iii) of Proposition 1 indicates that result (ii) holds only if g is greater than or equal the arithmetic
mean off the main diagonal. These differences are only due to the fact that Llamazares et al. [19]
consider a finite and not necessarily large population. To obtain a clearer understanding of these
differences, it is instructive to provide a geometric proof of the results contained in Proposition 1
by using one more time our representation of the problem.
Figure 11 displays the intersection of Figure 8 with the plane of equation Q(a, b) = Q(b, c), a
plane that cuts the cube into two along the main diagonal. This figure has been drawn with g being
the arithmetic mean.
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Figure 11: Geometric representation of results (i)-(ii) in Proposition 1 by Llamazares et al. [19].
This figure is drawn for g = am, ε = k/(2n) = 0.25 where n = 10 and k = 5 (left-hand side),
and ε = k/(2n) = 0.475 where n = 10 and k = 9.5 (right-hand side).
The key region is the intersection between the region of non transitivity of Pε and the region
R0. Consider the segment [Q0Q3], where Q0 = (0.5, 0.5, 0) and Q3 = (1, 1, 1). The segment
[Q0Q3] always intersects the region of non-transitivity of Pε. The intersection of the segment
[Q0Q3] with the region of non transitivity is given by the segment [Q1Q2]. Let us first compute
the coordinates of point Q2. By definition of D2, the third coordinate of point Q2 contained in the
region of non transitivity verifies: Q2(a, c) = 0.5 + ε. This point also lies both on the plane of
equation (16) defining R0 and, by construction, on the plane of equation Q(a, b) = Q(b, c). From
this, we obtain:
Q2(a, b) = Q2(b, c) =
3
4
+
ε
2
, and Q2(a, c) = 0.5 + ε.
We now turn to the computation of the coordinates of point Q1. Point Q1 lies on the frontier of
the parallelepiped D2 defined in the section (3.1) and on the plane of equation (16). From this, we
obtain:
Q1(a, b) = Q1(b, c) = 0.5 + ε, and Q1(a, c) = 2ε.
Llamazares et al. [19] consider the discrete case where the population is finite and not necessarily
large. In this context, consider that l ∈ {1, . . . , n} voters have a reciprocal preference relation
given by Q0, and n− l voters have a reciprocal preference relation given by Q3, and compute the
collective preference relation Q given by:
Q =
(n− l)
n
Q3 +
l
n
Q0.
The intensity Q(a, b) = Q(b, c) of Q is given by the discrete convex combination:
(n− l)× 1
n
+
l × 1
2n
= 1− l
2n
. (19)
The intensity Q(a, c) of the resulting collective preference relation Q is given by the discrete
convex combination:
(n− l)× 1 + l × 0
n
= 1− l
n
. (20)
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The collective preference relation Q lies on the region of non transitivity if it belongs to the
segment [Q1Q2] and satisfies (8), that is if:
0.5 + ε < 1− l
2n
≤ 0.75 + ε
2
, (21)
and
2ε ≤ 1− l
n
≤ 0.5 + ε. (22)
From (21) and (22) and the fact that ε = k/(2n), one obtains:
n− k
2
≤ l < n− k. (23)
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: k < n− 1. There are
(n− k)−
⌈
n− k
2
⌉
values of l satisfying condition (23). These values are represented by a white ∗ in the left-hand
side of Figure 11 for n = 10 and k = 5. This construction is used in the proof of result (i) in
Proposition 1 to show that Pk cannot be transitive for all profiles of reciprocal preference relations.
Case 2: k ≥ n − 1. There is no l ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfying condition (23). Indeed, for k ≥ n − 1,
condition (23) forces l < 1, which is not allowed. More precisely, if we consider the discrete
convex combination between Q0 and Q3 such that l = 1, then, by (19), the resulting collective
preference relation belongs to [Q1Q2] and satisfies (8) if:
1− 1
2n
> 0.5 +
k
2n
=⇒ k < n− 1,
which contradicts the initial hypothesis. This means than the resulting collective preference relation
either coincides with Q1 or lies outside the segment [Q1Q2]. Consequently, all other points that
one can obtain by a discrete convex combination between Q0 and Q3 lie outside the segment
[Q1Q2]. Such a situation is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 11 for n = 10 and k = 9.5.
This provides a geometric interpretation of why the argument developed for Case 1 fails when
k ∈ [n− 1, n[ and g is greater than or equal to the arithmetic mean. This situation can not appear
when the population is arbitrarily large and g ∈ G0 because the construction of non admissible
collective preferences is always possible following Case 1. Result (ii) in Proposition 1 establishing
that Pk is transitive for all profiles of reciprocal preference relations when k ∈ [n− 1, n[ and g is
greater than or equal to the arithmetic mean, is thus obtained by using an alternative argument. It
consists of observing that individual preferences leading to a collective preference such that aPkb
and bPkc necessarily lie in R ∩ [0.5, 1]3, and that the convex hull of R ∩ [0.5, 1]3 has an empty
intersection with G0 ∪G2 ∪D2.
On the contrary, when g lies below the arithmetic mean off the main diagonal, i.e. when for
each (x, y) ∈ [0.5, 1]2 such that x 6= y, we have g(x, y) < (x+ y)/2), it is possible to construct a
convex combination of individual reciprocal preferences which lies in G0 ∪G2 ∪D2. This is the
case, for instance, when g = min. This situation corresponds to result (iii) in Proposition 1. Such
a construction can be done as follows: assume for the sake of simplicity that n is even. Given a
value of k, pick any α > 0 such that:
0.5 ≤ 0.5 + k
2n
− α ≤ 0.5 + k
2n
+ α ≤ 1.
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Set
x = 0.5 +
k
2n
− α, y = 0.5 + k
2n
+ α.
In this way, we have:
(x, y) ∈ [0.5, 1]2, x 6= y and x+ y
2
= 0.5 +
k
2n
.
Because g is assumed to lie below the arithmetic mean, we have g(x, y) = g(y, x) < (x + y)/2.
Then, by continuity of g, there exists ν > 0 such that:
g(x+ ν, y + ν) = g(y + ν, x+ ν) <
x+ y
2
.
Consider the individual reciprocal preferences (x + ν, y + ν, g(x + ν, y + ν)) and (y + ν, x +
ν, g(y + ν, x+ ν)). Assume that one-half of the population has individual reciprocal preferences
of the first type and the remaining agents have individual reciprocal preferences of the second type.
Then, after a normalization, one obtains a collective outcome equal to:(
x+ y
2
+ ν,
x+ y
2
+ ν, g(x+ ν, y + ν)
)
.
The corresponding relation Pk is not transitive since it holds that:
x+ y
2
+ ν >
x+ y
2
= 0.5 +
k
2n
for the first two coordinates, and
g(x+ ν, y + ν) <
x+ y
2
= 0.5 +
k
2n
.
5 Conclusion
This paper contains two new contributions. The first contribution aims at showing that the proof
providing the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the majority based on difference in
support is non transitive can be simplified. Instead of using algebraic tools, as in Llamazares et
al. [19], we have demonstrated that this proof can be carried out with simple geometric tools. The
second contribution concerns the regions for which the majority based on difference in support
is non transitive. As a function of the model parameter ε, and for each kind of g-stochastic
transitivity, we characterize the shape of the regions for which P is non transitive when the
electorate is large. As shown in Section 4, the geometric analysis proves also useful for a small
electorate.
In the same manner as for the case of the non transitivity of Pε, other types of inconsistencies
of the majority based on difference in support can be studied under other points of view. A possible
route can concern the undesirable collective preference defined by aPεb, bIεc and aIεc. Another
route can concern the cyclicity of majority based on difference in support: instead of the non
transitivity of Pε, we could look at the situations defined by aPεb, bPεc and cPεa. Many other
possibilities can also be considered using the same geometric approach.
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